The Detrimental Impact of Ethnic Federalism on Ethiopia
Girma Berhanu (Professor)
Ethiopia represents a compelling case study in the implementation and consequences of ethnic federalism – a concept that sounds good in as much as “it empowers peoples and cultures” in a multi-ethnic state, but which has had thirty-years to reveal the discriminatory and plainly dangerous effects it has on the society it rules.
Indeed, ethnic federalism was originally intended to empower a wide range of ethnic groups and ensure their cultural identities. When explained in such neat terms, it is difficult to disagree with it.
It is important to remember that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is neither a theoretical construct nor a utopian vision — it has been official state policy since the early 1990s. In other words, it has had ample time to be tested — whether implemented well, poorly, partially, or incompletely is open to debate. What is not in doubt is that over 120 million Ethiopians live under, and are shaped by, its negative realities. A political idea that sounds appealing on paper is not necessarily good in practice. Political ideas are not mere intellectual exercises; they translate into lived realities that shape the daily lives of millions.
The reality is that, 30 years after ethnic federalism was implemented in Ethiopia, it has contributed to constant fragmentation, political instability and violent communal conflict. Although ethnic federalism has, at times, provided a tentative framework for autonomy, its long-term effects on national cohesion, institutional stability, and social harmony are deeply troubling.
Perhaps it is a good idea to provide comparisons of just what this means in practical terms. If Germany or Spain were ethnic-federal systems, and not just “federal” systems, the realities would be just as troubling. It would mean that the federal states are established along ethnic lines —that the state of Hesse (Germany) is for Hessians and the state of Andalusia (Spain) are for Andalusians, which leads to the tricky question of establishing exactly “who” is a Hessian and an Andalusian. Our common sense might argue that anyone living in Hesse or Andalusia is, logically, a Hessian and an Andalusian. But we would be wrong. Because ethnic federalism doesn’t consider “where you live” to determine “what you are” –that’s what simple federalism does. When we add the critical “ethnic” to “federalism” the question of “who is what” becomes much more loaded, and the answer far more controversial. A Hessian will be someone who is “ethnically Hessian” and an Andalusian will be “someone who is ethnically Andalusian”. It does not matter that you and your family have lived in Frankfurt or Kessel for two or three generations, it does not matter that you and your family have lived in Seville or Granada for two or three generations. You are not “ethnically” from that region.
In practice, ethnic federalism adds an impossible burden on millions of people across the country. Because the regional state they live in is determined by ethnicity, only people with a “pure ethnicity” will be entitled to its benefits –social benefits, public sector jobs, elected jobs. This is the reality of Ethiopia since the early 1990s, where people living in Tigray but who are “not ethnically Tigrayan” are, in effect, second-class citizens. They may continue to live in Tigray, as their parents and grand-parents did, but they will not access education grants, they will not access public sector jobs of Tigray regional state, they will not be able to get elected to government positions, even at the lowest municipal level. This toxic feature is not a signature trait of Tigray regional state. The exact same discrimination will apply to a Tigrayan living in Afar regional state, or an Oromo living in Somali regional state, or an Amhara living in Oromia regional state.
The problem with ethnic federalism is that it sounds good and makes sense on paper –as it did when its chief implementor, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, while still a guerrilla fighting against the Derg regime in the 1980s, sketched out its details in sophisticated theoretical essays that leaned heavily on Marxist-Leninist theory. His theory, like many communist theories that stretch beyond the confines of economics, made assumptions that were simply untrue. Worst of all, these assumptions became even more false as time progressed –the reality of fluid times and changing societies.
In the picture-friendly theory of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic state in which all peoples (nationalities, ethnic groups, tribes) have been systematically marginalised by an overbearing and centralist “Amhara doctrine”. The solution, in this scenario, is to empower these nationality, ethnic groups and tribes and in the process wipe out the cultural traits of “Amhara dominance”.
Without wishing to credit or discredit this idea, it is an undeniable fact that it bears little resemblance to the reality of Ethiopia. Firstly, because a large proportion of Ethiopian citizens are not “purely” from one ethnic group or nationality, but the result of freely-mixing peoples. This fact is easy to determine: talk to any Ethiopian, especially in an urban centre, and we quickly grasp the reality of mixed backgrounds. This is, by no means, a measure of Ethiopian exceptionality –it is the product of 20th and 21st century social mobility, in Ethiopia as elsewhere. People move around. People fall in love. People settle down. People get married and start a family. The dictionary definitions of ethnicity and territorial purity mean little or nothing.
Secondly, the idea of “Amhara dominance” needs to be put in context. At its most extreme, it means that foods, drinks, names and holidays are all symptomatic of “Amhara dominance”. Injera, tejj honey wine, Orthodox Christian names, and Orthodox Christian celebrations. If we choose a strikingly simplistic, black-and-white example, we may just about see this pattern of dominance. A remote tribe in the Lower Omo Valley, whose members gradually move towards these cultural patterns, at the expense of their own, in order toreap the rewards of social integration. On the other hand, the reality of ordinary Ethiopians, in their millions and spread across the country, is that they comfortably navigate a range of identities. They may live in Oromia Regional State and feel Oromo; indeed, they may have an Oromo parent while at the same time identify with the Christian Orthodox faith and have normalized its yearly celebrations. Indeed, their names may well be Amharic, and not Oromo. Where does such profile belong? In the perverse logic of ethnic-federalism, he will likely not be considered a “pure” Oromo who deserves the benefits, including the state protection, of the Oromia Regional State.
Ethiopia, therefore, does not suffer from federalism per se, but suffers from the type of federalism it has adopted. Ethnic federalism—where federal units are defined along ethnic lines—has, in many respects, undermined the very goals it was intended to achieve.
The answer to this problem is not to scrap federalism and push for a centralist state –our history teaches us clearly how this would lead to a whole new set of problems– but to redefine federalism so that it leaves individuals aside. In short, leave ethnicity aside. The basis of the federal system, like in other countries, should be geographical. Ethiopia’s long history provides ample historical and geographical realities on the ground to determine these federal units, as was the case in Germany or Spain. As a result, every federal unit will, by its own very nature, be populated by a mix of peoples –and let us not forget, the majority of Ethiopians are already, in themselves, of mixed backgrounds. We call for the elimination of ethnic purity from social discourse and from government policy.
A geographically based federal system could preserve the cultural and territorial rights of indigenous communities while fostering interethnic cooperation and national unity. The challenge, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia should be a federation, but rather what kind of federation it should be.
Defining Ethnic Federalism
Ethnic federalism is a constitutional arrangement in which the constituent units of the federation are organized primarily based on ethnicity. In theory, this model aims to guarantee self-determination and cultural preservation for distinct ethnic groups. In practice, however, particularly in the Ethiopian context, ethnic federalism has resulted in a range of negative political, social, and economic outcomes.
Key Disadvantages of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia
1. Erosion of National Unity
2. Encouragement of Secessionist Tendencies
3. Marginalization of Minorities Within Ethnic Regions
4. Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts
5. Fragmentation of National Development
6. Weakening of Central Authority
7. Institutionalization of Identity Politics
Conclusion
While ethnic federalism was conceived as a means toaccommodate Ethiopia’s ethno-linguistic diversity, its practical implications have been destabilizing. Rather than promoting inclusion, the system has exacerbated ethnic divisions, encouraged separatism, and weakened both governance and national identity.
A more viable alternative would be a territorially based federal system that recognizes Ethiopia’s diversity while promoting shared citizenship, political pluralism, and national integration. Such a model would better balance the needs of local autonomy with the imperatives of national unity and development.
Ethiopia’s path forward requires a fundamental rethinking of its constitutional structure. If left unaddressed, the current federal arrangement risks further eroding the state’s cohesion and accelerating its descent into protracted conflict.
GIRMA BERHANU
Professor
GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY
Department of Education and Special Education
girma.berhanu@ped.gu.se