Political Opportunism, Elite Co-optation, and Political Self-Sabotage in Ethiopia
Girma Berhanu (Professor)
Abstract
Why do some Amhara political elites cooperate with authorities whose policies are perceived by many Amharas as threatening their collective interests and security? This paper examines elite collaboration in Ethiopia from the establishment of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)-led government in 1991 to the political transition following Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018 and the subsequent conflict in the Amhara region.
Drawing on scholarship on ethnic federalism and authoritarian governance, comparative political theory, and conversations with two former senior Amhara regional officials, the paper explores five explanations for elite collaboration: political and economic opportunism, elite co-optation, fear and coercion, ideological divergence, and the pursuit of political survival. It also examines the psychological mechanisms of obedience, conformity, and moral disengagement, alongside the historical and institutional conditions that may contribute to political fragmentation.
The paper asks whether recurring patterns of elite accommodation reflect individual choices, institutional incentives, historical experiences, or broader social and political dynamics. It rejects the assumption that collaboration demonstrates an inherent cultural disposition toward self-sabotage. Instead, it argues that elite behavior must be understood through the interaction of personal interests, political institutions, social networks, and unequal power relations. Ultimately, the paper seeks to explain the apparent divergence between the priorities of some political elites and the security, rights, and aspirations of the communities they claim to represent.
1. Introduction: The Problem of Political Collaboration
Why do some Amhara political elites collaborate with political authorities whose actions are perceived by many Amharas as harmful to their community?
This question concerns the relationship between individual ambition, political power, collective identity, and public responsibility. It became particularly significant following the establishment of the EPRDF-led government in 1991 and the political transition associated with Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018.
The 1995 Constitution reorganized Ethiopia around ethnolinguistically defined regional states and recognized the self-determination rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples. Supporters viewed ethnic federalism as a means of addressing historical inequalities and accommodating diversity. Critics argued that it institutionalized ethnic divisions, weakened shared citizenship, and generated new forms of exclusion.
For many Amharas, concerns included political representation, territorial administration, and the security of Amhara communities living outside the Amhara regional state. Scholarship by Jon Abbink and Ketemaw Muluye provides useful starting points for examining these debates.
Expectations that the 2018 political transition would address longstanding grievances gradually gave way to renewed tensions between the federal government and Amhara political movements. In 2023, fighting escalated following the government’s decision to integrate regional special forces into the national security structure. Fano forces resisted this process, and the conflict intensified. The International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch have documented the conflict’s political and humanitarian dimensions. The reported atrocities against civilians are deeply appalling and demand urgent international attention. Yet the scale of the humanitarian crisis affecting the Amhara population remains insufficiently recognised in international discourse. Reports that approximately six million children have been out of school over the past four years, alongside allegations of widespread discrimination against Amhara people, raise profound concerns about the protection of fundamental rights, access to education, and equal treatment. These claims warrant rigorous documentation and sustained international scrutiny.
This raises a fundamental moral question: how can individuals and institutions committed to human dignity, justice, and equality justify collaborating with political forces accused of contributing to the persecution and suffering of a vulnerable population? At a time when civilian protection and the prevention of mass atrocities should be paramount, silence, indifference, or uncritical collaboration risks undermining the very principles that international solidarity and human rights are meant to uphold. The suffering of the Amhara people deserves serious attention, impartial investigation, and recognition grounded in evidence—not neglect or selective concern.
Within this context, allegations that some Amhara political figures have cooperated with federal authorities against Fano or other Amhara political movements have generated intense controversy. Their motivations remain important questions for investigation. Do they seek personal advancement or material benefits? Are they motivated by fear, ideological conviction, or political survival? Do they believe accommodation offers a more effective route to peace and influence than resistance?
This paper examines these questions without assuming that every political alliance constitutes betrayal or that Amhara political opinion is uniform. Its central concern is why some elites accommodate powerful authorities even when their decisions may conflict with the interests of significant sections of the communities they represent.
2. Historical and Institutional Context
The political order established after 1991 reshaped the incentives facing Ethiopia’s political elites. Regional institutions were organized substantially around ethnic identity, while the EPRDF maintained extensive influence over political competition and regional administrations.
As Abbink’s analysis suggests, ethnicity became central to political discourse and institutional practice. This arrangement sought to recognize historically marginalized identities but also generated disputes over representation, territorial boundaries, and competing conceptions of citizenship.
Critics of the federal system argue that Amharas were sometimes treated as representatives of historical domination rather than as a diverse population with distinct political interests and rights. Such claims require examination against constitutional provisions, historical records, and the experiences of affected communities. A balanced analysis must distinguish the stated objectives of ethnic federalism from its institutional operation and consequences.The transition of 2018 did not automatically eliminate established political networks, habits of governance, or patterns of elite accommodation. Yohannes Gedamu’s work on ethnic federalism and authoritarianism provides a framework for investigating how institutions and elite relationships can persist across changes in political leadership.
The relevant question is whether dependence on central authority, access to state resources, and restricted political competition create incentives for some Amhara elites to accommodate the government rather than challenge its policies. This possibility deserves systematic investigation rather than an assumption that collaboration reflects a distinctive cultural weakness.
3. Elite Co-optation and Political Opportunism
Elite co-optation occurs when powerful authorities incorporate influential individuals or groups into governing structures to secure cooperation, weaken opposition, or neutralize challenges to their power. The incentives may include public office, political recognition, access to resources, personal protection, and influence over local administration.
Under authoritarian or highly centralized political systems, accommodation may be individually advantageous even when it imposes costs on the wider community. Resistance can lead to imprisonment, dismissal, economic hardship, or physical danger, whereas cooperation may preserve an individual’s position and influence. Yet similar political behavior can reflect different motivations: personal ambition, ideological conviction, strategic calculation, or fear and coercion.
This framework offers a useful analytical lens for examining political alignments in Ethiopia. Among the public figures whose political conduct and relationships with political power may warrant closer scrutiny are Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam (?), the late Professor Endrias Eshete, Professor Dagnachew Assefa, Deacon Daniel Kibret, Demeke Mekonnen, Dr. Degu Andargachew, Genet Zewdie, Dawit Yohannes, and former Fano leaders who have defected or surrendered to government forces. This list is not exhaustive, and space does not permit a discussion of all the individuals who might merit consideration.
These individuals occupy different positions and have distinct political histories. Their inclusion in this discussion should not be interpreted as a conclusion that they have all been co-opted by the authorities. Rather, each case requires independent and evidence-based examination of public statements, political appointments, relationships with government officials, and actions following changes in political allegiance. Such an approach is essential to distinguish documented conduct from political interpretation, speculation, or accusation.
Dr. Degu Andargachew, for example, is perceived by some observers as having sought to reconsider, or even atone for, aspects of his previous political conduct. This interpretation, however, should be assessed critically against his own public statements, documented actions, and subsequent political engagements. Ultimately, the objective should not be to condemn individuals on the basis of their affiliations alone, but to examine their conduct, the principles they uphold, and the consequences of their political choices for the pursuit of justice, accountability, and the protection of the Amhara population.
I find it difficult to reconcile what I perceive as instances of personal advancement taking precedence over collective political interests. Nevertheless, political disagreement or cooperation with the government does not, by itself, establish betrayal, opportunism, or personal enrichment. The task is to determine whether, and under what circumstances, elite co-optation helps explain particular political decisions.
Nor is my inquiry dependent on establishing the ethnic identity of every individual mentioned. I have not sought to verify anyone’s ancestry, nor do I regard ethnic identity as a prerequisite for analyzing political conduct. My concern is with the broader dynamics of elite accommodation, political alignment, and the incentives shaping individual choices within Ethiopia’s political system. Ultimately, the central question is how personal ambition, political survival, institutional dependence, and access to state resources influence elite behavior across successive administrations—and whether these incentives create a persistent gap between the interests of political elites and the communities they claim to represent.
A useful investigation would ask:
Political opportunism also extends beyond appointments. Material incentives may include access to public contracts, business opportunities, or preferential treatment. Establishing such connections requires documentary evidence, including procurement records, asset disclosures, and beneficial ownership information. Wealth or political association alone does not prove corruption.
Status and recognition can be equally influential. Former opposition figures may find renewed authority attractive after losing influence within their original movements. Conversely, defections and surrenders by Fano members may reflect military exhaustion, internal divisions, disillusionment, fear, strategic calculation, or genuine changes in political conviction.
The central analytical task is to distinguish these explanations rather than treating every change of allegiance as evidence of selfishness.
4. Fear, Coercion, and Political Survival
Political collaboration may also occur under conditions of coercion. Threats, detention, surveillance, intimidation, economic pressure, and risks to family members can limit an individual’s freedom to oppose those in power.
Human Rights Watch has documented serious abuses and restrictions affecting civilians and political actors in Ethiopia, including during the conflict in the Amhara region. This broader context makes coercion a relevant explanation, although it does not establish the motives of any particular individual.
Three overlapping categories can help clarify the issue:
These distinctions matter morally as well as analytically. An individual who cooperates under threat should not automatically be judged in the same way as someone who voluntarily exchanges political support for personal advancement. Without reliable evidence about individual circumstances, however, these explanations remain hypotheses rather than established conclusions.
5. Ideological Divergence and Elite Detachment
Shared ethnic identity does not guarantee shared political priorities. Some Amhara elites may prioritize national unity, constitutional continuity, or the avoidance of civil war, while others emphasize regional autonomy, protection from state violence, territorial claims, or support for armed resistance. For example, a politician opposing Fano may believe that armed struggle will prolong instability and endanger civilians. A supporter of Fano may argue that resistance is necessary because existing institutions have failed to provide security and accountability. Neither position, by itself, proves loyalty or betrayal.
A deeper problem emerges when political elites develop interests that diverge from those of the wider population. Their careers, security, economic opportunities, and influence may depend on institutions that ordinary people experience differently. Under such conditions, preserving elite access to power may take precedence over public accountability. This concern is particularly serious when Amhara communities experience violence, displacement, and insecurity while some of their political representatives appear more concerned with maintaining their positions than addressing those conditions.
Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics offers a possible framework for examining how political power shapes whose lives are protected, whose populations are exposed to violence, and whose suffering receives inadequate recognition. Applied cautiously to Ethiopia, the framework could help investigate state protection, political vulnerability, and accountability during the Amhara conflict.
The key questions are whether political institutions adequately protect Amhara communities, how political elites respond to threats against their constituents, and whether their decisions reinforce or challenge existing patterns of vulnerability. Decades of political marginalisation and recurring violence have left many Amhara feeling increasingly insecure in their own ancestral homeland—as though they were “dead men walking”in a land to which they have deep historical ties. This situation raises difficult questions about the role of individuals of Amhara origin who, through their political affiliations, decisions, or actions, may have contributed to or legitimised conditions that perpetuate the vulnerability of their own communities. Addressing these questions requires careful examination of documented evidence, individual responsibility, and the distinction between political disagreement and complicity in practices that undermine the safety and dignity of a population.
Ian Buruma’s (2023) The Collaborators: Three Stories of Deception and Survival in World War II provides a valuable point of departure for exploring the complex moral and political dilemmas associated with collaboration under oppressive conditions. Through historical accounts of individuals navigating occupation, deception, and survival during the Second World War, Buruma invites readers to reflect on the often-blurred boundaries between accommodation, complicity, opportunism, and self-preservation. These dilemmas also resonate with contemporary Ethiopia, where the political conduct of individuals of Amhara origin who align themselves with state authorities merits critical and evidence-based examination.
Nevertheless, historical comparisons must be approached with caution. Political alignment alone does not establish complicity, just as opposition to a government does not automatically demonstrate moral integrity. Rather, the central questions concern individual agency, the constraints under which political choices are made, and the consequences of those choices for vulnerable communities. Of particular importance is the extent to which individuals enable, legitimise, resist, or challenge practices that threaten the security, dignity, and fundamental rights of their own communities. Ultimately, the issue is not simply whether individuals collaborate with those in power, but how their decisions should be understood in relation to political responsibility, moral accountability, and the protection of human life.
6. The Psychology of Collaboration
Political psychology offers additional explanations for why individuals may cooperate with authorities whose actions conflict with their stated moral commitments. Stanley Milgram’s research on obedience to authority, Solomon Asch’s experiments on conformity, and Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement provide useful conceptual starting points. Although these studies cannot directly explain Ethiopian political behavior, they identify mechanisms that merit investigation.
Obedience to authority. Individuals operating within hierarchical institutions may defer responsibility to superiors or justify their actions as official duties. Such reasoning can weaken their sense of personal responsibility for harmful consequences.
Conformity and group pressure. Political actors may align with colleagues, party leaders, or influential networks to preserve professional advancement, social belonging, or personal safety. Others may genuinely share the prevailing position, making it important to distinguish conformity from conviction.
Moral disengagement. Individuals may justify harmful conduct by presenting it as necessary, minimizing its consequences, transferring responsibility to superiors, or portraying opponents as undeserving of protection. These mechanisms can operate among government officials, opposition leaders, armed groups, and their supporters.
These theories should generate research questions rather than serve as diagnoses of particular individuals. Establishing their relevance requires examining public statements, decision-making processes, institutional pressures, and the consequences of political choices.
7. Is Political Self-Sabotage Embedded in Amhara Culture?
Recurring political divisions may create the impression that self-sabotage is embedded in Amhara culture or collective psychology. Such a conclusion, however, risks confusing the behavior of particular elites with the characteristics of an entire population. Political fragmentation, factionalism, and collaboration with powerful authorities occur across societies. Moreover, elite conduct is not necessarily representative of popular values. Where institutions reward accommodation and punish opposition, similar behavior can recur without requiring an explanation based on an inherent cultural disposition.
Family histories and inherited political narratives may influence loyalties, social networks, and expectations of leadership. They do not establish that collaboration or moral weakness is biologically or culturally inherited. A more productive approach would investigate how historical experiences, institutional incentives, political networks, and social expectations shape elite behavior. Relevant questions include how communities understand political loyalty, what consequences follow from opposing powerful authorities, and whether institutions reward accountability or personal access to state power.
My concern is not that Amharas possess an inherent tendency toward self-destruction, but that recurring patterns of elite accommodation and political fragmentation may undermine collective security and political representation. Explaining these patterns requires evidence about specific decisions and their consequences, not generalized judgments about a people’s character.
8. Conclusion
Why do some Amhara political elites collaborate with authorities whose policies are perceived by many Amharas as harmful to their collective interests? This paper identifies several plausible explanations: personal ambition, material incentives, elite co-optation, fear and coercion, ideological divergence, political survival, and psychological mechanisms such as obedience, conformity, and moral disengagement. These explanations are neither mutually exclusive nor equally applicable to every individual. Collaboration may represent opportunism in one case, coercion or strategic accommodation in another, and genuine political disagreement in a third. Distinguishing among these possibilities requires case-specific evidence and careful attention to the consequences of political decisions.
Drawing on scholarship, comparative perspectives, and conversations with two former senior Amhara regional officials, this paper proposes an institutional and historically grounded approach to understanding elite behavior in Ethiopia. Its central argument is that recurring political fragmentation should not be attributed to an inherent cultural defect. Instead, it should be investigated through the interaction of political institutions, historical experiences, social networks, individual incentives, and unequal power relations.
Ultimately, the critical question is whether political elites remain accountable to the communities they claim to represent. Understanding why that accountability sometimes breaks down is essential to explaining elite collaboration and identifying the political conditions under which representation can better protect public security, rights, and collective interests.
References
Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the experiment after 20 years. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5(4), 596–618.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(9), 1–70.
Asmamaw, B. T. (2026). Half a knife: An Amhara resistance writer’s reckoning. Baye Asmamaw.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(3), 193–209.
Buruma, I. (2023). The collaborators: Three stories of deception and survival in World War II. Atlantic Books.
Gedamu, Y. S. (2021). The politics of contemporary Ethiopia: Ethnic federalism and authoritarianism. Routledge.
Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2024: Ethiopia. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/ethiopia
Human Rights Watch. (2024). “If the soldier dies, it’s on you”: Attacks on medical care in Ethiopia’s Amhara conflict. Human Rights Watch.
International Crisis Group. (2023, November 16). Ethiopia’s ominous new war in Amhara (Africa Briefing No. 194).
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. Harper & Row.
Muluye, K. (2020). The formation of Ethiopia’s federation and its implications for the Amharas’ quest for recognition and boundary demarcations. Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society.
Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15(1), 11–40.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press.
Epilogue
The poem captures the tragic fate of a rural Ethiopian woman, particularly an Amhara woman, whose life is consumed by endless labor—from the strength of youth to the frailty of old age. She grinds grain day after day, sustaining others while her own dreams, dignity, and aspirations remain buried beneath the dust of the grinding stone.
Like Sisyphus, she is condemned to an endless cycle of toil, with no meaningful reward, no recognition, and little hope of escape. She does not even know the name of the prime minister, while political elites who claim to represent her rise to power, enjoy privilege, and live in luxury in her name. The distance between her suffering and their prosperity exposes a painful contradiction between political representation and the lived realities of ordinary people. Perhaps the poem’s most devastating revelation is that, while she spends her life grinding grain, time quietly grinds her down. By the time she looks into the mirror, she can no longer distinguish the flour in her hair from the gray of old age. She has spent a lifetime feeding others, only to discover that life itself has consumed her. And those who speak in her name have risen, while she remains where she has always been—beside the grinding stone, forgotten by the very world her labor sustains.
በዕውቀቱ ስዩም
ላ’ንዲት የገጠር ሴት
————————-
ስትፈጭ የኖረች ሴት፣
መጁ በመጠኗ፣ ወፍጮውም በልኳ ፣
ጓያ ትፈጫለች
ጓያ ሽሮ ሲሆን ያበቃል ታሪኳ።
አስባው አታውቅም…
ወደ ኦናው ምድር ለምን እንደመጣች፣
ከ’ለታት አንድ ቀን፣ከና’ቷ ሆድ ወጣች፣
ከ’ለታት አንድ ቀን፣ ጡት አጎጠጎጠች፣
ከ’ለታት አንድ ቀን፣ ለባሏ ተሰጠች።
.
ተዚያን ቀን ጀምራ፣
ተዚያን ቀን ጀምሮ፣
ድንግል ድንጋይ ወቅራ፣
ትፈጫለች ሽሮ።
.
አታውቅም፣
ማን እንደሚባሉ፣ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ፣
አታውቅም፣
ሹማምንት በ’ሷ ስም፣ ምን እንደሚሠሩ፣
አነሳኹት ‘ንጂ፣ እኔም ለነገሩ፣
በፖለቲካ ጥበብ ራስን ማራቀቅ፣
ምን ይጠቅማትና ጓያዋን ለማድቀቅ።
.
ከቶ ማንም የለ, አበባ ‘ሚሰጣት፣
ከቶ ማንም የለ፣ ከተማ ‘ሚያወጣት፣
ከቶ ማንም የለ ፣ በዳንኪራ መላ፣
ወገቧን የሚያቅፋት፣
ልፋቷም፣ዕረፍቷም፣
ወደዚህ መጅ መሳብ
ወደዚያ መጅ መግፋት።
እንደ ዓባይ ፏፏቴ ፣ ሽሕ ዓመት ቢንጣለል፣
ቢጎርፍም ዱቄቱ፣
እንደ ሲኦል ወለል፣ ጫፍ የለውም ቋቱ።
.
ከዘመናት ባንዱ
መስተዋት ፊት ቆማ፣በተወለወለው፣
ፊቷን ለማዬት፣
ከጸጉራ ላይ ያለው
ዱቄት ይኹን ሽበት. ሲያቅታት መለዬት፣
ያኔ ይገባታል የተሰጣት ዕጣ፣
ከማድቀቅ ቀጥሎ፣መድቀቅ እንዲመጣ።
.
የመጅ አገፋፏ–አምሳለ ሲሲፈስ፣
ከቋት ስስት እንጂ፣ ሲሳይ አይታፈስ፣
ትቢያ ‘ሚተነብይ ዱቄት በዙሪያዋ፣
ከባርኔጣ አይሰፋም፣ የኑሮ ጣሪያዋ፣
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